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German Idealism and the 
Development of Psychology in the 
Nineteenth Century 
DAVID E. LEARY 
THE BIRTH OF MODERN SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY is generally placed in Germany around 
1850. This birth is credited by the standard historiography to the dual parentage of the 
empirical school of philosophy and the experimental study of sensory physiology. There 
is also a tradition of giving a nod toward Kant and Herbart as predecessors, for varying 
reasons, of the rise of scientific psychology. ~ Almost completely overlooked in the lit- 
erature is the influence of post-Kantian German idealism upon the development of the 
concepts, subject matter, and methods of psychology. This is somewhat surprising since 
idealism was the dominant philosophical movement in Germany in the first half of the 
nineteenth century. The purpose of this article will be to present a general survey of the 
relationship between German idealism and the development of psychology in the nine- 
teenth century. The article will be divided into three sections: (1) the idealistic concep- 
tion of the science of psychology; (2) a survey of idealistic psychology; and (3) the 
contributions of idealistic psychology. 
The Idealistic Conception of the Science of Psychology To understand the ideal- 
istic conception of psychology as a science, it is necessary to review the philosophy of 
science proposed by the leading German idealists, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich 
Wilhelm von Schelling, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. "Science" meant some- 
thing quite different for them than it did for Kant in Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der 
Naturwissenschaft (Metaphysical foundations of natural science, 1786). 2 From this 
change in the definition of science there naturally followed a change in what it meant for 
psychology to be a science and a corresponding change in the attitude toward, and 
approach to, psychology. 
One of the most crucial changes in the definition of science resulted from the ideal- 
ists' abolition of things-in-themselves. Since they no longer considered natural objects 
as separate from, and prior to, the ego, the central Kantian distinction of a posteriori and 
a priori lost its significance for them. Knowledge, the idealists now maintained, does 
not result from the a posteriori experience of things-in-themselves; rather "things" are 
themselves manifestations of will (Fichte), imagination (Schelling), or reason (Hegel). 
i See my "Philosophical Development of the Conception of Psychology m Germany, 1780-1850," Journal 
of the History of the Behavioral Sctences 14 (1978): 113-21, where I argue that Kant and Herbart, as well as 
Fries and Beneke, deserve more than just a nod 
2 Metaphystcal Foundations of Natural Science, trans James Elhngton (Indianapohs: Bobbs-Merrdl, 1970). 
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There are not two spheres of knowledge, the rational and empirical. Rather all knowl- 
edge or "science" (Wissenschaft) is one; all knowledge can be reached by the same 
method; all knowledge can form a system. In fact, since reality is ultimately unitary, 
according to the idealists, knowledge must form a system if it is to be complete and 
whole. Only then can "science" be said to be certain. 
It is not by chance that two of the most common words in the titles of the works of 
the German idealists were Wissenschaft and System. These words, which became prac- 
tially synonymous, represented the goal of the idealist philosophers. As Hegel wrote, 
voicing a conviction common to them all, "the truth is only realized in the form of 
system. ''3 This system is the fullness of science. Obviously, there has been a change 
here in the meaning and significance of "science" and its relation to philosophy. With 
Kant, science---or as he defined it more narrowly, natural science--was an autonomous 
enterprise which philosophy must investigate in order to clarify the presuppositions that 
make it possible. Philosophy thus provides critical, second-order reflections upon the 
nature of science. To the idealists, philosophy itself is science, not simply a reflection 
upon science. It is not merely critical; it actually produces true knowledge. With this 
change a major intellectual revolution (in the etymological sense of "turn") has taken 
place. Once again philosophy has been made the ultimate "science," and natural 
science, which had been struggling for liberation from philosophy since at least the 
seventeenth century, is once more made subordinate to it. 
However, the idealists did not wish to eliminate natural science altogether. They 
granted it a place within their systems. Even though they thought that natural scientists 
mistakenly "reified" the objects of their investigations (into things-in-themselves) and 
misunderstood the significance of natural science, nonetheless, as Hegel put it, the em- 
piricism of natural science did have the positive advantage that it was based on "the 
great principle that whatever is true must be in the actual world and present to sensa- 
tion.'4 This for the idealists, who believed in the identity of nature and spirit, was a true 
and proper starting point for philosophy; but it was only that, a starting point. The 
idealists rejected natural science, empiricism, and common sense insofar as these re- 
mained at the level of "mere" sensation. They rejected the static and partial view of 
reality that, as they maintained, was the only possible result of a purely sensationalist 
and objectivist (or "dogmatic") philosophy. 
The crucial distinction upon which the German idealists based their critical analyses 
of natural science was the Kantian distinction between understanding (Verstand) and 
reason (Vernunft). According to the idealists, the problem with natural scientists and 
with Kant, whose philosophy was a defense of natural science, was that they based 
science upon the understanding rather than reason. In other words, the idealists crit- 
icized the reliance of natural scientists upon the categories of understanding and their 
corresponding rejection of dialectical reason. The categories (such as causality and sub- 
stantiality), the idealists maintained, are static; or put another way, they are nonhistor- 
ical. They therefore cannot reveal the fullness of the "objects" they describe since that 
3 G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Bailhe, 2nd ed. (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1949), p. 85. 
4 Quoted in Hegel: The Essential Writings, ed. Frederick G Weiss (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), p. 
125. 
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completeness, the idealists insisted, is something which is not yet accomplished. Reality 
is a process which has not yet reached its teleological goal. That goal, and the true 
essence of  reality, can be known only through a progressive logic, that is, through 
dialectical reason. Only by subjecting empirical data--and,  according to Hegel, the 
categories themselves--to critical (and dialectical) analysis can we proceed beyond them 
to a higher stage at which both subject and object are more nearly one. In this manner 
alone can the philosopher transcend the limitations, contradictions, and one-sidedness of 
natural science and common sense and approach closer and closer to the absolute and 
unitary truth about reality. 
In this process of  developing "science" into a system which expresses the absolute 
essence of  reality, the idealists maintained, neither mathematics nor experimentation 
offer much help. Mathematics, they said, like natural science in general, presents only 
fixed, "dead," and formal half-truths which are based upon the false assumption of  
equality. Stated differently, mathematics fails to go beyond the surface of "things" be- 
cause it is concerned with quantitative "determinations" rather than with qualitative es- 
sences. 5 Experimentation, on the other hand, exemplifies another characteristic limita- 
tion of  natural science in general. In itself, according to Schelling, it provides "nothing 
but a collection of facts, of reports on what has been observed, of  what has happened 
under either natural or artificially-produced conditions. TM Only if experimentation is sup- 
plemented and thus transformed by "scientific" reasoning can it lead to anything beyond 
a mere collection of  data. Otherwise, it is, as Hegel wrote, "the mere semblance of [a 
demonstration].'7 
Thus, in summary, just as the idealists felt that their work completed Kant 's,  so too 
did they feel that their philosophies completed natural science. It is not surprising that 
Naturphi losophie (philosophy of nature) became an important part of their work, espe- 
cially Schelling's and Hegel's. The avowed task of this philosophy of  nature was to 
discover among the facts reported by natural scientists the teleological pattern in nature. 8 
The popularity of  various systems of this Naturphi losophie,  coupled with the extrava- 
gance of  some of  its propositions and its preeminence over natural science in most of  the 
German universities, led to a great deal of ill feeling between German scientists and 
philosophers in the 1820s and 1830s. Indeed much of  the residual modern antagonism 
between science and philosophy can be, and has been, traced to this period of time. 9 
This does not mean, however, that the idealists totally rejected natural science in the 
same way that many natural scientists rejected philosophy. As has been shown, the 
idealists accepted natural science as a point of  departure. In developing their philoso- 
phies of nature, both Schelling and Hegel demonstrated a surprising knowledge and 
acceptance of  contemporary science, to Their major criticism was not that it was wrong 
5 Hegel, Phenomenology, pp. 100-102. 
6 Friednch Wilhelm von Schelltng, Einleitung zu dem Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphdosophie (1799), 
in Schelhngs Werke, ed. Manfred Schroter, 13 vols. (Mumch, 1929-59), 2 : 283. 
7 Phenomenology, p. 104 
8 In a slmdar way, Hegel used the contemporary "'science" of h~story as the bas~s for the development of a 
philosophy of h~story which proposed the teleological pattern w~thm human history. 
9 See Frederic Lilge, The Abuse of Learnmg (New York, 1948), chap. 3. 
10 See Schelling, Erster Entwurf emes Systems der Naturphdosophie (1799), m Schelhngs Werke, 2 : 1-268; 
Hegel, Die Naturphtlosophze, 3d ed. (1830), m Hegel's Sammtliche Werke, ed. Hermann Glockner, rev. 2d 
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but that it was insufficient. Natural science accepted "things" at their face value; it failed 
to utilize the critical capacities of  reason to get beyond the obvious empirical level to 
more essential levels where individual "facts" achieve their true significance as integral 
parts of  the entire system of reality. 
One such individual "fact" or "thing" in the world is the individual finite ego that is 
the object of  psychology. This too, the idealists insisted, is but a part of a larger whole, 
and it can be understood only when its place within the system of reality is determined. 
This conviction reflects the fact that German idealism was not a subjective idealism; it 
tended to subordinate the finite ego to a larger process of  the Absolute Ego. This helps 
explain the dominant attitude of  the idealists toward psychology: being anti- 
individualistic, the idealists tended to be antipsychological.  Or perhaps better stated in 
terms of  the prior discussion of the idealistic conception of natural science, the idealists 
viewed psychology as an intermediate and inadequate science of man. Just as the indi- 
vidual had to be transformed and completed by a process of immersion into the absolute 
totality of  reality, so too did psychology, like physics, have to be transformed and 
completed by the workings of "scientific" reasoning. Psychology, which provides 
knowledge of  the individual subjective mind, was considered only a step toward real 
knowledge of  the realm beyond the individual in which subject and object become, and 
are known, as one. 
Of the three major German idealist philosophers, Schelling maintained the closest ties 
to the individualism which had characterized the German humanism of the previous 
period. For instance, he devoted attention to personality and character. ~ However, even 
he spoke of  the individual ego as a manifestation of the Absolute and insisted that "the 
complete system of science begins with the Absolute Ego. ''t2 With Fichte and Hegel the 
bias against individualistic psychologizing was even more pronounced. The ultimate end 
of Fichte's philosophy, for instance, was the socialization of the individual in a unified 
system. For all his discussion of  freedom, he made it clear that he did not advocate 
individualistic freedom. As he wrote in his Reden an die deutschen Nat ion (Addresses to 
the German nation, 1808), individual self-seeking, which is "the root of all other cor- 
ruption," must be countermanded by an education (indoctrination) that presents "a pic- 
ture of the moral world-order so vivid that the pupil [will be] filled with passionate love 
and yearning for that order" and thus be "fashioned" in such a way that "he simply 
cannot will otherwise than you wish him to will. ''~3 This controlling vision behind 
Fichte's philosophy is loaded with social-psychological implications, but Fichte himself 
did not develop a system of social psychology. The point is simply that his approach to 
man was not individualistic. He was not concerned with the processes internal to a 
single individual except as these were a part of  the greater whole of social reality. In 
fact, Fichte's discussion of the ego, often understood as referring to the individual ego, 
ed., 26 vols. (Stuttgart, 1936-54), vol, 9. It should be noted that Fichte was less interested in nature per se 
(except as non-ego) and more interested in human social reality. 
i~ See Schelhng, Philosophische Untersuchungen itber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit 
zusammenhangenden Gegenstdnde (1809), m Schelhngs Werke, 4 223-308; and "Anthropologlsches Schema" 
(Nachlass), m Schelhngs Werke, 5 : 333--40. 
J2 Schelling, Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie (1795), in Schellings Werke, 1 : 100. 
~3 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Addresses to the German Nation, trans. R. F. Jones and G. H. Turnball, ed. 
George Armstrong Kelley (New York. Harper and Row, 1968), pp 7, I 1, 18. 
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actually concerned the Absolute Ego, which in his system was the beginning and end of 
the historical process.~4 The dialectic of history proceeded from the Ego to the Non-Ego 
and then to the subsumption of Ego and Non-Ego into the unity of the Absolute Ego; it 
was not lived out, according to Fichte, in the lives of individual finite egos. 
Neither Schelling nor Fichte addressed himself directly to the topic of psychology. 
Their attitudes toward psychology have to be culled from the general orientations of 
their philosophies. Hegel, however, discussed psychology at length, and it is in his 
work that the antipsychologistic bias of German idealism is most clearly expressed. As 
he wrote in describing his first major work, his philosophy was intended "to replace 
psychological explanations as well as more abstract discussions of the foundation of 
knowledge" by portraying "the various forms of the spirit as stations on the way on 
which it [spirit] becomes pure knowledge or absolute spirit. ' ' s  The main point of 
Hegel's philosophy was to describe (and aid) the development of the spirit from its 
subjective to its objective and, finally, its absolute state. These three "forms of the 
spirit"~subjective, objective, and absolute-- were the "stations" of the teleological de- 
velopment of reality. Specifically, the finite subjective ego of the first stage was sub- 
sumed at a higher level of development into a social consciousness that in turn would be 
lost in the realm of the absolute. In this architectonic system, with its tripartite division 
and sequence of subjective spirit-objective spirit-and-absolute spirit, psychology is a 
science of subjective spirit. As such, it provides only partial knowledge at a very ru- 
dimentary level of reality that must be "overcome" (aufgehoben) by the development of 
social consciousness. This development beyond psychology takes place, according to 
Hegel, when the "I," motivated by its own insufficiency, moves beyond itself in a 
dialectical fashion. "Self-consciousness," Hegel wrote, "attains its satisfaction only in 
another self-consciousness. ''t6 Together these two self-consciousnesses form a "we" that 
is the beginning of social consciousness. Only in the "we" can that 'T '  be compre- 
hended, and even then only imperfectly since the "we" in turn must be "cancelled" 
(aufgehoben) someday in its immersion into the Absolute Spirit. 
Thus, just as physics was considered inadequate because it accepts the objects it 
investigates as they seem rather than submitting them to a critical, dialectical analysis 
which would reveal that they were known only incompletely at first, so too psychology 
is considered inadequate because it investigates the "particular individual" only in "a 
concrete form." This individualistic approach can reveal only "the incomplete spirit." In 
order to know the spirit more completely--indeed, in order that the spirit become more 
complete--"the lower concrete form of existence [must be] sunk into an obscure 
moment; what was formerly an objective fact (die Sache selbst) [must be] now only a 
single trace; its definite shape [must be] veiled, and become simply a piece of 
shading. '"7 As in physics, one must begin with the concrete, but this is only the starting 
point of the "science" of the spirit. Psychology provides knowledge of the spirit's tem- 
~4 Fichte has often been misinterpreted as assigning primary status to the indwidual ego, but he exphcitly 
rejected this interpretation of his meaning m his winter lectures of 1810-11. See Fichte, Si~mmthche Werke, 
ed. I. H. Fichte, tl vols. (Berlin, 1834-46), 2:607. 
~5 Quoted from Hegel's 1807 advertisement (Selbstanzetgen) for Phdnomenologie des Geistes as translated 
in Hegel: Texts and Commentary, trans, and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. 4. 
16 Phenomenology, p. 226. 
17 Ibid., p. 89. 
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porary abode in the concrete, individual "station," but this is a very inadequate knowl- 
edge of the true nature and significance of the mind. Even knowledge of the spirit in its 
"objective," social "station" is incomplete. Only in the region of the absolute--reflected 
in art, religion, and philosophy--can the spirit hope to be truly itself, free and complete. 
And that completeness has not yet been reached. 
The point is this: psychological dynamics had best be "overcome" or "cancelled." In 
and of itself psychology cannot provide an adequate description of human reality. 
Again: the individual ego is but a manifestation or integral part of something much 
larger than itself. True comprehension, true systematic science, reveals psychology to 
be the study of the mere "chaff '  or "husks" through which reality reveals itself. 
Yet Hegel does have much to say about psychology, and the philosophies of both 
Schelling and Fichte are pregnant with implicit psychological doctrines. More signifi- 
cantly, the work of these three German idealist philosophers had a direct influence upon 
others--their disciples--who were more concerned than they with developing psychol- 
ogy according to the idealistic orientation. 
A Survey of Idealistic Psychology There was no orthodox idealistic psychology. 
As we shall see in the following review, it would be more precise to speak of the 
idealistic psychologies of the early- and mid-nineteenth century. However, there was a 
basic unity among these psychologies--an overall unity in orientation, which we have 
just reviewed in the previous section, and a slightly more diversified unity of kinship. 
That is, all the idealistic psychologies were related to one or more of the three basic 
families of idealists--those descending from Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. 
From a psychological viewpoint, Fichte bequeathed three important notions to his 
followers. The first notion, that of "consciousness," was taken by Fichte from Karl 
Leonhard Reinhold. In his attempt to correct and complete Kant's philosophy, Reinhold 
had argued that Kant's system failed to command assent because of its dualistic founda- 
tion upon the antitheses of phenomenal and noumenal realities as well as upon both 
theoretical and practical concerns. Only if a truly ultimate principle could be found, 
Reinhold maintained, could philosophy be firmly established on the bedrock of cer- 
tainty. Reinhold argued further that he had discovered this fundamental principle that 
constitutes the basic and irreducible fact of all experience and knowledge. It was, he 
said, the principle of "representation" (Vorstellung) or "consciousness" (Bewusstseyn). 
For in consciousness both subject and object are contained, and without consciousness 
neither subject nor object is conceivable. ~8 Fichte, leading the way for the later idealists, 
accepted "consciousness" as fundamental and accepted Reinhold's contention that the 
task of philosophy is to give a systematic description, or "phenomenology," of con- 
sciousness. 
Fichte's systematic elaboration of the principle of consciousness led him to his ideal- 
istic view of consciousness as an ever active ego which produces the objects it 
"overcomes" both in theory (knowledge) and in practice (action) as it strives for further 
and further development. This emphasis upon the unceasing activity of the ego was 
Fichte's second important notion. From it came a third influential notion, the idea that 
18 See Reinhold's Versuch emer neuen Theorte des menschhchen Vorstellungsvermogens (Jena, 1789) and 
Ueber das Fundament des philosophtschen Wtssens (Jena, 1791 ). 
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the ultimate manifestation of the ego's activity is the will. Thus his philosophy was 
voluntaristic and stressed that the truth about reality is best expressed in human choice 
and action. 
Fichte's influence was very wide, extending to all the subsequent idealists regarding 
the central focus on consciousness. Since his themes were broad, the idealistic psycho- 
logists who took their lead from Fichte were not limited by any orthodox dogmas, and 
thus it is difficult to label many of them as "Fichtean" in any strict sense. However, a 
number of psychological thinkers were quite clearly indebted to Fichte. G. E. A. Meh- 
mel, for instance, utilized Fichte's principle of psychic activity as the guiding concept in 
his Versuch einer vollstiindigen analytischen Denklehre, als Vorphilosophie (Essay on a 
complete analytic doctrine of thought as a propaedeutic to philosophy, 1803). ~9 From 
this basic principle of activity, interpreted as impulsivity at the most elementary level, 
Mehmel developed psychological theories of the cognitive, emotive, and aesthetic 
processes. Both his reliance upon a fundamental principle and his choice of activity as 
that fundamental principle were typical of early nineteenth-century idealistic psychol- 
ogy. Both were part of Fichte's legacy. 
More important than Mehmel and others, however, was Karl Fortlage, who wrote his 
works well after the period in which idealist philosophy had its greatest popularity, 
Perhaps this very fact reveals the fecundity of Fichte's ideas as well as, or better than, 
Fortlage's works themselves: forty years after Fichte's last works, and sixty years after 
his important early works, Fichte's ideas could still influence creative thought in the 
field of psychology. To his credit, Fortlage did not accept Fichte's ideas uncritically. 
Nor did he use a completely speculative method. Instead he attempted to combine em- 
pirical rigor with philosophical, and particularly Fichtean, speculation. In his two- 
volume System der Psychologie (System of psychology, 1855), for instance, he let the 
empirical facts regarding psychic activity occasion a speculative discussion of the self; 
and the empirical description of the functioning of the nervous system and musculature 
provided the "'necessity," he felt, for a philosophical analysis of agency and will. 2~ For- 
tlage believed that this two-sided method of observation and speculation served to enrich 
psychology by drawing the philosophical significance out of its empirical research and 
making it the basis for philosophical extrapolation. The chief purpose of using this 
method in his System der Psvchologie was to give empirical substance to Fichte's specu- 
lative insight regarding the primacy of activity and the centrahty of consciousness. Tak- 
ing a genetic viewpoint, Fortlage traced the development of consciousness from the 
basic impulsivity of the human body to its fullness in conscious will. In this way he tied 
together all three of Fichte's basic notions in one systematic psychology and portrayed 
the will, as did Fichte, as the goal of psychological development. 
Although he did not himself perform experiments, Fortlage appreciated the signifi- 
cance of experimental physiology and discussed his own conclusions within the context 
of current empirical findings. Thus, certain ideas of Fichte--particularly the emphasis 
upon consciousness, activity, and will--were updated and brought into the forefront of 
'9 Erlangen, 1803. 
2~ Leipzig, 1855. Fortlage credited Herbart and Beneke for his adoption of empmcal methodology (see 
ibid., l:xvff.). This is a good example of the influence of nomdeahsttc empmcal psychology upon second- 
generation ldeahst~c psychologists. 
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psychological thought in the 1850s. And they were reemphasized in the following years 
when Fortlage published three volumes of psychological lectures and investigations. 2~ It 
was around the same time that the earlier works of Arthur Schopenhauer were 
"rediscovered" and had a very great impact upon German thought. This served to rein- 
force the voluntarism, if not the stress upon consciousness, that can be traced to Fichte's 
thought. 
Schelling's philosophy also inspired later psychological applications. Even Fortlage, 
Fichte's disciple, reflected one aspect of Schelling's influence in his emphasis upon the 
unconscious as a necessary antecedent and corollary of consciousness. This theme of the 
unconscious, however, and Schelling's discussions of personality, genius, and mythical 
consciousness were typically "romantic." They can be traced also to the works of Her- 
der and Hamann, and even to the revival of interest in the German mystics. Perhaps 
more significant because more specifically Schellingian was the influence of the philos- 
ophy of identity upon the development of psychophysical investigations. According to 
Schelling's philosophy of identity, both subject and object--or mind and nature--are 
actually but two aspects of the same absolute reality. Thus, "inner" spirit and "external" 
nature are ultimately identical, even if empirical appearances seem to be to the con- 
trary. ~2 As applied in psychology, this postulate was translated into the proposition that 
the nature of mind is reflected in the structure of the brain and the type of personality is 
reflected in the structure of the body. This proposition became a major incentive for 
many investigators. Karl Friedrich Burdach, for example, was inspired by this Spinoz- 
istic view of body and mind as two aspects of a single unitary reality. 23 So also was Karl 
Gustav Carus. 24 But certainly the most significant influence of this doctrine was upon 
Gustav Theodor Fechner, who developed the formal science of "psychophysics" in the 
late 1850s in an attempt to prove the philosophy of identity. 25 Through the work of 
Fechner, which inspired Wilhelm Wundt and the first generation of experimental psy- 
chologists, this aspect of Schelling's philosophy influenced the course of modern psy- 
chology. 
Fechner's rationale was quite simple, and he came to it, he said, by a sudden flash of 
insight. Convinced of the Schellingian doctrine that mind and body are essentially one, 
he wanted to prove this fact in a scientific manner so that he could persuade his col- 
leagues, both scientific and philosophical alike, of the essential unity--and the fun- 
damental spiritual nature--of all creation. What he needed to show was the irreducible 
relation between mind and body, and his insight was that there should be a demonstrable 
and lawful mathematical relationship between changes in the intensity of bodily stimula- 
tion and contemporaneous changes in the states of internal consciousness. He located 
zl Acht psychologtsche Vortrage (Jena. 1869); Vier psychologtsche Vortritge (Jena. 1874), and Bettriige zur 
Psychologie als Wlssenschaft aus Speculation und Erfahrung (Lelpzig, 1875). 
22 Schelhng first developed his phdosophy of identity in Vorlesungen uber dte Methode des akademzschen 
Studiums ( 1803; 3d ed., 1830), in Schelhngs Werke, 3 : 229-374. 
53 Burdach. Das Seelenleben (Stuttgart, 1836). 
24 Cams wrote companion volumes entitled Psyche: Zur Entwwklungsgeschichte der Seele (Pforzhelm, 
1846) and Physts: Zur Geschtchte des leibhchen Lebens (Stuttgart, 1851 ). 
z5 Fechner demed any direct influence of Schelhng's identity theory, but he acknowledged that Oken's 
Naturphdosophie, which was "rooted in Schelhng's perspective." was the original respiration for his work. 
See Wilham R. Woodward, "Fechner's Panpsychlsm. A Scientific Solution to the Mind-Body Problem," 
Journal of the History of the Behavzoral Sctences 8 (1972):367-86, esp. p. 385. 
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the key to this relationship in a finding he dubbed "Weber's Law," and he developed 
various techniques for confirming and extending its significance. Using both measured 
stimulus conditions and introspective reports of sensation, Fechner elaborated the new 
science which he formally presented in his Elemente der Psychophysik (Elements of 
psychophysics, 1860). 26 This landmark contribution is generally considered one of the 
important points of departure for modern experimental psychology. 
Another proposition of Schelling's thought had a similar impact upon psychology. 
This was the tenet that it is necessary, in developing systematic science, to present 
knowledge historically--that is, in the history of its genesis--rather than as the static 
results of an investigation. 27 One cannot understand final conclusions, Schelling main- 
tained, without understanding the context in which they were reached. Nor can one 
understand a given reality without comprehending how it came to be. This proposition 
encouraged a number of investigators to undertake a genetic approach to psychological 
analysis and to write books with titles like Geschichte der Seele (History of the soul). 
Gotthilf Heinrich von Schubert's popular Geschichte der Seele (1830) was one of 
these; 2~ Karl Gustav Carus's Psyche: Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Seele (Psyche: 
toward a developmental history of the soul, 1846) was another. 
As a natural historian, Schubert found Schelling's historical approach very congenial. 
Having defined the soul as that which seeks for God, or fullness of being in the Abso- 
lute, he began his Geschichte with a discussion of "outer nature" and proceeded through 
the study of plants, animals, and the human body to an investigation of the human soul 
(Seele). Also in a genetic and progressive manner, Schubert considered the basic rela- 
tionship between soul and body, sensation, the feelings, temperament, physical expres- 
sions of the soul, disturbances of the soul, self-consciousness, reason, and understand- 
ing. His treatise concluded with an investigation of the ways in which the individual 
soul reaches beyond itself by means of art, science, and the state until it enters the 
domain of the Spirit (Geist) in religious belief and self-abnegation. This "history" por- 
trayed the psychic tendency of all nature toward the Absolute. Schubert believed, as did 
Schelling, that it was only within this pattern of historical development that the human 
mind could be understood. 
Though the popularity of Schubert's book was confirmed by its later revised editions, 
and though the book provides a nice example of the "historical" approach to psychol- 
ogy, it was written very much in the old style of pure speculation. A much better 
example of Schelling's influence on subsequent psychology is provided by the work of 
Karl Gustav Cams, who approached his psychological work from the position of a 
comparative anatomist and physiologist rather than as a speculative natural historian. 
Thus, as is clearly seen in his early Vorlesungen fiber Psvchologie (Lectures on psychol- 
ogy, 1831), Carus informed his genetic approach with a scientific knowledge of the 
physiological development of the nervous system, and his developmental "history of the 
soul" as presented in Psyche was interwoven with empirical threads. -'9 What makes 
Cams an even better example of the influence of Schelling's philosophy, however, is 
26 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1860). 
27 This is a repeated theme in Schelhng's Vorlesungen i&er &e Methode 
28 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1830) 
2~ Leipzig, 1831. 
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the fact that Cams not only used the genetic method recommended by Schelling, he also 
took up Schelling's stress upon the role of the unconscious and the interrelationship of 
mind and body. The combination of all these tenets in Carus's work produced a founda- 
tion for comparative psychology, with which he was concerned long before he wrote 
Vergleichende Psychologie oder Geschichte der Seele in der Reihenfolge der Thierwelt 
(Comparative psychology or history of the soul in the sequential species of the animal 
world, 1866). 3o In this and other works, Cams traced the gradual development of con- 
sciousness in the animal world. Using myth, allegory, and analogy--the tools of Schel- 
lingian Naturphilosophie--as well as empirical evidence, Carus sought to determine the 
relationship between man and animals. Not surprisingly, animals were found to possess 
many "human" faculties while lacking others. They were found, that is, to be at a more 
rudimentary stage in the "history of the soul." Man, on the other hand, was found to 
express the fullness of natural capacity, and more. Man's ability to choose and to pos- 
sess the thought of eternity, Carus said, gives notice of his capacity to transcend mere 
"nature." Although he concluded Vergleichende Psychologie, as well as Psyche,  with 
this typical idealist theme, Carus's advocacy of, and contributions to, comparative psy- 
chology were important stimuli to later developments. 
Beyond comparative psychology, Carus also did much to establish what was later to 
be called physiological psychology. In doing so he tried to prove the relationship Schell- 
ing had postulated between mind and body. He did this not only in his studies as a 
well-known physiologist but also as an advocate of "cranioscopy," otherwise known as 
"phrenology." Through a series of works he documented what he felt to be clear 
evidence of the relationship between the organs of the brain and various psychological 
faculties. 3~ In the process of discussing these faculties, Carus contributed to the change 
of perspective regarding psychologial faculties by explicating them as genetically related 
to one another in the life-histories of individuals. That is, in opposition to the old view 
of faculties as completely separate entities, Carus portrayed them as various interrelated 
functions which emerge at different stages in the history of the soul. It is easy to see 
here the beginnings of a developmental approach to psychological functions. 
There were, of course, other psychologists influenced by Schelling. Johann Christian 
August Heinroth, for instance; and F. C. Th. Fischer and Heinrich Steffens. 32 But ex- 
cept for Heinroth's Lehrbuch der Seelengesundheitskunde (Textbook of the science of 
mental health, 1823-24), which is distinctive because of its application of "dialectic" to 
the consideration of mental health, the works of these individuals exemplify the same 
general tendencies we have seen in the works of Fechner, von Schubert, and Carus. 
Hegel, as mentioned in the previous section, wrote more than Fichte and Schelling on 
specifically psychological topics. Most notably, he devoted the first sections of his Phi- 
losophie des Geistes (Philosophy of mind, 1830) to anthropology, phenomenology, and 
30 Vienna, 1866. It should be noted that Karl Fnednch Burdach had previously written a Comparative 
Po'chologie, 2 vols (Leipzig. 1842). 
~ Hts most important work along these lines w a s  Grundzuge emer neuen und  wtssenschafthchen 
begrtindeten Cranioscopie (Schadellehre) (Stuttgart, 1841) 
32 Heinroth, Lehrbuch der Seelenge~undhett~ktmde, 2 vols ILeipzig, 1823-24) and Die P9 als 
Selbsterkenntmsslehre (Leipzig, 1828), Fischer. Die Lehre yon den Arten under der charaLtert~ttschen Natur 
der Vermogen und Emrichtungen unserer Seele (Leipzig, 1830), and Steffens. "Ueber die wlssenschafthche 
Behandlung der Psychologie" (1845), pubhshed in his Nachgelassene Schrtften (Berlin, 1846), pp. 187-214. 
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psychology. Under the title of anthropology Hegel included discussions of the most 
fundamental processes of human experience, namely, sensation and basic feeling. In his 
phenomenology of consciousness he discussed consciousness proper and self- 
consciousness, under which he included the phenomena of desire. And then in the sec- 
tion on psychology he discussed the psychological processes of both theoretical and 
practical mind and their unity in the "free mind" that is the transition from subjective to 
objective mind (or spirit). The theoretical processes for Hegel included intuition, mem- 
ory, and thinking; the practical processes included practical feeling, or emotion, and 
will. The distinctive characteristic of Hegel's discussion of psychology is that it empha- 
sized the interrelationship and optimal integration of mental processes. In opposition to 
former "common-sense" empirical psychology, of which he considered Aristotle's "still 
by far the most admirable," Hegel's psychology was not concerned with "the question 
whether mind or soul is simple or immaterial, whether it was substance." These ques- 
tions reveal that "mind was still treated as a thing," according to the "inert, fixed" 
categories of the understanding (Verstand). Instead Hegel insisted that mind "is not an 
inert being, but on the contrary, absolutely restless being, pure activity. ''33 And just as 
mind itself should not be considered a static thing susceptible to the categories of under- 
standing, so too the mind should not be "converted into a mere aggregate of independent 
forces" or entities known as "faculties. T M  In the place of such "common-sense" notions 
about the mind, what was really needed, Hegel claimed, was a "speculative" treatment 
of the mind that would reveal its "living unity." The mind must be understood in its 
dynamic integration: only the ill mind could be conceived as fragmented and reified. 
Such was Hegel's psychological vision. Even though the actual working out of this 
vision in his Philosophie des Geistes is limited and uneven, it provided the basis for the 
subsequent development of "Hegelian psychology. ''35 
Following Hegel, certain psychologists developed psychology as "the science of sub- 
jective spirit." In doing so, they defended themes I have earlier characterized as typical 
of Fichte and Schelling respectively, that is, the doctrine of the mind as activity and the 
doctrine that mind can be comprehended only in its "necessary development. ''36 But the 
Hegelians were distinguishable from those psychologists who were inspired by Fichte 
and Schelling in at least two ways. First, they tended more than the others to perpetuate 
the subordination of psychology to a higher social perspective. This was particularly 
true, of course, of the so-called left-wing Hegelians. Carl Ludwig Michelet, for in- 
stance, in his Anthropologie und Psychologie oder die Philosophie des subjectiven Geis- 
tes (Anthropology and psychology or the philosophy of the subjective spirit, 1840), 
included a discussion of different racial and social types. 37 Later in time, Hegelian no- 
tions of the embodiment of "objective spirit" in social groups had an important influence 
upon the development of social psychology, especially as formulated in VOlkerpsycholo- 
33 Philosophy of Mind, trans. William Wallace, with Zustttze translated by A. V. Mtller (Oxford Oxford 
University Press, 1971), p. 3. 
34 Ibid , p. 4. 
35 As early as 1841, Franz Exner pointed out that there was a distinctive type of psychology which could be 
called "Hegelian." See his Die Psychologw der Hegelschen Schule, 2 vols (Leipzig, 1841-42), for a critical 
review. 
36 Hegel espoused these same themes in Philosophy of Mind, e g , p. 5 
37 Berlin, 1840. 
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gie (Folk psychology). The work of Moritz Lazarus and Hayim Steinthal, as well as the 
VOlkerpsychologie of Wilhelm Wundt, owed much to the legacy of Hegelian thought, 
despite Wundt's denials and the fact that Lazarus and Steinthal were primarily Herbar- 
tians. From Hegel's time on, the way to study the "mind" of a people was to study its 
"objective" expression in art, religion, and philosophy, as well as in language, taw, 
custom, and myth. And going beyond the stage of social consciousness, the individual 
mind was also commonly subordinated to the "absolute spirit," often conceived in the 
"mythological" form of the "personality of God." Another work of Michelet, Vorlesun- 
gen iiber die Pers6nlichkeit Gottes und Unsterblichkeit der Seele, oder die ewige 
Pers6nlichkeit des Geistes (Lectures on the personality of god and immortality of the 
soul, or the eternal personality of the spirit, 1841), is a good example of this approach. 38 
The second way in which Hegelian psychology tended to differ from other idealist- 
inspired psychology was in its continued dependence upon the dialectical, or rational, 
method and its resistance to empirical methods. Over time the psychologist-disciples of 
both Fichte and Schelling were influenced by contemporary developments in empirical 
psychology. They began, as we have seen, to include empirical approaches in their 
methodological repertoire. This was much less often the case with Hegelian psycholog- 
ists, although there were some exceptions. Johann Georg Mussmann, for example, 
made a gesture toward empiricism in his Lehrbuch der Seelenwissenschaft oder rationel- 
len und empirischen Psychologie (Textbook on the science of the soul or rational and 
empirical psychology, 1 8 2 7 ) .  39 Beginning with a conceptual definition of each psycho- 
logical topic, such as feeling, sensation, dreaming, and knowing, Mussmann allowed 
observations insofar as they bore on, or fit within, the ideally prescribed area of discus- 
sion. From a positivistic perspective this was clearly a backward and very limited em- 
piricism. 
Despite Mussmann's tentative example, however, the Hegelians as a group resisted 
the natural tendency of "second-generation" thinkers to become eclectic and accommo- 
date their methods and doctrines to current trends. The reasons for this are quite com- 
plex and can be indicated here only schematically. Undoubtedly the fact that Hegel rose 
to his highest peak of popularity in the 1820s, after the fame of both Fichte and Schell- 
ing had been eclipsed, was partially responsible for the longer-lasting cohesiveness and 
faithfulness of his school. This cohesiveness was such that it transcended the "schisms" 
which rent Hegel's disciples along ideological lines. Both "left" and "right" Hegelians 
clung to the supremacy of the dialectical method. Also influential was the definition, 
which Hegelian psychologists continued to follow, of psychology as the study of men- 
tal processes qua mental--that is, excluding, on the one hand, purely physiological 
sensation, and on the other, the specific contents of consciousness. Sensation was to be 
dealt with in "anthropology": the contents of consciousness, in the sciences of 
"objective spirit." Thus, psychology was understood as the dialectical study of the 
dialectical processes of the mind. In other words, as normally conceived, psychology 
was the systematic, or "speculative," reflection of mind upon itself. This definition 
excluded an empirical approach, and it may well be that the polemical atmosphere of the 
1830s and 1840s reinforced this narrow view of psychology. Against the radical materi- 
38 Berhn, 1841. 
~ Berlin, 1827. 
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alism which, developing partly from radical Hegelianism, denied the very existence of 
mind (Geist), Hegelian psychologists continued to assert the existence and comprehensi- 
bility of the human spirit. 
At any rate, whatever the reason, Hegelian psychologists did not develop, as did 
Burdach and Carus, a psychology that was physiological or comparative. In this sense 
their psychology was the most narrowly "philosophical" and "mentalistic" of the idealist 
psychologies. Excluding physiology from its domain, it was out of tune with the devel- 
opments of the day. Pushing dialectical analysis to its extreme and beyond, it often lost 
contact with the empirical object of its study. For instance, a typical strategy of Hege- 
lians was to consider feelings, not as the results of physiological ennervations, but as 
dialectical moments in the evolution of consciousness. As if this exclusion of physiol- 
ogy did not limit the purview of psychology sufficiently, Hegelian psychologists also 
excluded consideration of the unconscious. They dealt only with the operations of the 
conscious mind without seeking correlations with physical or nonconscious states. As 
late as 1882, in the sixth edition of his Psychologische Briefe (Psychological letters), 
Johann Eduard Erdmann continued to pursue this disembodied view of the subjective 
spirit. Psychology, he said again, does not concern what the spirit is, but how it func- 
tions at the subjective level. 4~ This is the same theme he expressed forty-two years 
earlier in his Grundriss der Psychologie (Outline of psychology, 1840), and the same 
orientation can be found in Karl Friedrich Rosenkranz's Psychologie, oder Wissenschaft 
vorn subjectiven Geist (Psychology, or science of the subjective spirit, 1837), another 
popular Hegelian text. 4~ 
As a result of this orientation, Hegelian psychologists presented phenomenological 
and speculative accounts of the mental processes that often amounted to little more than 
psychological commentaries on Hegel's philosophy of mind. In this regard, both Erd- 
mann and Rosenkranz were typical. Erdmann's Grundriss der Psvchologie, for instance, 
consisted of sections on "anthropology" (mind as individual), "phenomenology of 
consciousness" (mind as ego), and "pneumatology" (the mind as mind itself). Under the 
first heading came reflections upon sensations, physical feelings, and bodily habits; 
under the second, perception, consciousness, self-consciousness, social behavior, and 
social consciousness; and under the third, intelligence and will, with intellective will 
being the endpoint of the development of subjective spirit. Despite some slight changes 
in the content and order of presentation, this was an essentially orthodox rendition of 
Hegelian thought. What was novel in Erdmann's work, and in that of the other Hegelian 
psychologists, was the amount of elaboration and importance given to this psychological 
thought. 
Of course, less orthodox works were also produced by the Hegelian school. Among 
these were Leopold George's Lehrbuch der Psvchologie (Textbook of psychology, 
1854) and Franz Vorl~inder's Grundlinien einer organischen Wissenschaft der menschli- 
chen Seele (Foundations of an organic science of the human soul, 1841).42 But however 
unorthodox, these works were still easily distinguished as Hegelian. For although 
4o Erdmann, Psvchologtsche Briefe, 6th ed. (Leipzig, 1882). A seventh edmon of this book appeared post- 
humously in 1896. 
4~ Erdmann (Leipzig, 1840); Rosenkranz (Komgsberg, 1837) 
42 George (Berhn, 1854); Vorlander (Berhn, 1841) 
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George's book was based on an earlier work that utilized the empirical findings of 
recent physiological research, 43 and though Vorl~inder expressed his "organic 
psychology" in his own terms, they both covered the traditional Hegelian topics and 
concluded with the typical discussion of the eternal sustenance of individual personali- 
ties in God. 
The Contributions of Idealistic Psychology With these brief reviews of German 
idealism and its psychological perspective, we are now prepared to make a number of 
conclusions about post-Kantian idealistic psychology and its influence upon the devel- 
opment of the concepts, subject matter, and methods of psychology. To give shape to 
this discussion, 1 will make six major points, followed by a brief summation. 
1. There was indeed such a thing as idealistic psychology in Germany in the first 
half, and even the second half, of the nineteenth century. This fact is often overlooked, 
largely because of the antipsychologistic bias reflected in the basic orientation of ideal- 
istic philosophy. But not only was there an idealistic psychology, there were also differ- 
ent varieties of idealistic psychology and a good number of texts representing each 
variety. We have surveyed only the most important ones above. It is important to note 
that these texts continued to appear, and continued to be popular, well into the 1870s. 
2. This idealistic psychology was developed by the disciples of the major idealists. 
Consequently, the contributions of idealism to psychology did not always come directly 
from the three major idealists themselves. Rather, such influence as they had was often 
mediated and amplified through the psychological works of their disciples. This is im- 
portant to note, first of all, because few of these noteworthy disciples are ever men- 
tioned in treatises on the history of psychology: and second of all, because many of the 
more influential of these disciples--such as Fortlage, von Schubert, Burdach, and 
Carus--were not as pristinely idealistic as Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Instead they 
freely admitted being influenced by the works of anti-idealists, such as Jakob Friedrich 
Fries, Johann Friedrich Herbart, and Fnedrich Eduard Beneke. 44 This is significant be- 
cause it is probably the case that this contact with empiricism accounts for some of the 
positive influence of the idealistic school of philosophy. Not only did it check the specu- 
lative tendency in idealistic psychology, it also made idealistic psychology more palat- 
able to the taste of more natural scientifically oriented readers. 
3. Idealistic psychology it~uenced the development of various concepts and related 
subject matters (such as consciousness, ego, personality, imagination, and will) that 
became a prominent part of later psychology. This point has not been given sufficient 
attention in the literature. Idealism contributed many of the central concepts and 
concerns of late-nineteenth-century psychology, including the most central one, con- 
sciousness. This must be understood if the importance of idealism is to be acknowl- 
edged. As Helmut E. Adler has written in a related context, 
Sensory phenomena had been studied by physiologists and physicists, but that alone would not 
have led to an independent science. One does not classify E. H. Weber. Helmholtz. Mach. or 
43 George .  DtefunJ Smne (Berhn.  1846) 
a4 Regard ing  Fries. Herbart ,  and Beneke,  see m~ " 'Phdosophlcal  Development  "" 
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Aubert primarily among psychologists, even though they made highly significant contributions to 
psychology. The essential idea that the mind---consciousness---could be measured, was missing. 45 
Adler wrote this as a preface to a discussion of  the contribution of  Gustav Theodor 
Fechner; but without denying Fechner's contribution regarding the necessity of  
measurement we can go four steps further back regarding the origins of  his desire to 
study mind or consciousness. Fechner got his inspiration from the Naturphilosophie of  
Oken, who in turn got his inspiration from Schelling, who in turn based his work on that 
of Fichte, who based his work on Reinhold's fundamental principle of  "consciousness." 
The entire nineteenth-century tradition of  "phenomenology," or the systematic study of  
consciousness, is part and parcel of  the post-Kantian idealist tradition. Fechner's contri- 
bution, as pointed out earlier, was to apply Schelling's principle of  identity to the study 
of  consciousness; the result was psychophysics. Later Wilhelm Wundt further developed 
experimental, or "physiological," psychology and defined its subject matter as "the 
manifold of  consciousness. ''46 The empirical and experimental restrictions he placed 
upon the study of  consciousness came from a natural scientific tradition quite distinct 
from idealistic philosophy, but the object of  study was clearly taken from the idealist 
tradition? 7 In this way both Fechner and Wundt- - the  two "founders of  modem 
psychology"--were  part of a much larger intellectual tradition in mid- and late-nine- 
teenth-century Germany, the tradition of  Idealrealismus which attempted to combine 
idealism and realism, utilizing the essential insights of both while avoiding the exclusive 
dogmatism of either. It should be noted that this "mediated way" was itself an applica- 
tion of the dialectical principle inherent in much idealistic thought. It should also be 
noted that we could similarly trace the concepts of  ego, personality, imagination, and 
will, as well as the concepts of the unconscious, psychic activity, and self-actualization, 
to either idealistic origins or idealistic influences. For now, however, it is possible to 
state only programmatically that German idealism influenced the development of  these 
various concepts and subject matters of psychology. 
4. Idealistic psychology influenced the development o f  voluntarism and a social- 
psychological perspective, both o f  which came to o'pif3' late-nineteenth-centuo' theories 
about the higher cognitive processes. These points were mentioned above in the review 
of  idealistic psychology. It was principally Fichte who, in stressing practical reason (or 
will) over theoretical reason, influenced the shift away from Leibnizian intellectualist 
psychology toward the voluntarism of the later part of the century. Of the major "new 
psychologists" Wundt was as vociferous as any in claiming that his psychology was 
voluntaristic. While there is more than one step from Fichte's idea of voluntarism to 
Wundt 's ,  there is a historical connection mediated through a host of  mid-century psy- 
chologists, philosophers, and physiologists--including Wundt 's  mentor, Helmholtz 48-- 
45 "The Vicissitudes of Fechnerian Psychophyslcs m America,'" Annals of the New York Academy of 
Sciences 291 (1977) : 22 
46 Prmciples of Phystologtcal Psychology, vol 1. trans from 5th German ed (1902) by Edward Bradford 
Titchener (New York: Macmillan, 1910), p. 11 
47 For d~scussions of Wundt's work which are sensitive to the influence of the ~deahst tradition, see Arthur 
L. Blumenthal's "A Reappraisal of Wilhelm Wundt," Amerwan Psychologist 30 (1975): 1081-86; and his 
"Wilhelm Wundt and Early American Psychology: A Clash of Two Cultures." Annals oJ the New York 
Academy of Sciences 291 (1977) : 13-20. 
4s Regarding the influence of Flchte on Helmholtz, see R Steven Turner. "Hermann von Helmholtz and the 
I~mpincist Vision," Journal of the H~story of the Behavtoral Sciences 13 (1977):48-58 
3 14 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 
who followed Fichte in refusing to accept the traditional intellectualist analysis of the 
mind. Among the philosophers who had some impact upon late-nineteenth-century Ger- 
man psychology, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche should also be mentioned as conduits of 
this new voluntarism. 
As far as the social-psychological perspective is concerned, idealism gave a philoso- 
phical justification for (and incentive towards) this orientation by stressing the ultimate 
unity of finite egos within a larger social and/or absolute ego. Indeed this is the 
"antipsychologistic" thesis of idealism--that the individual mind is not an autonomous 
entity which can be analyzed in and of itself. Particularly Fichte, Hegel, and Hegel's 
disciples spread this social-psychological doctrine. Their influence blended with that of 
others--Herder, Hamann, and Herbart, for instance--to bring about the development of 
"folk psychology" and all its related disciplines, such as psycholinguistics, mythology, 
cultural anthropology, forensic psychology, and sociology. This "folk psychology" was 
recognized by Wundt as the only valid means of studying the higher mental processes. 
Only within a social context, he said, could the truly human, symbolic aspects of exper- 
ience be understood. 49 Again, an originally idealistic thesis had been endorsed by one of 
the principal systematizers of modern psychology. 
5. Idealistic psychology encouraged a genetic approach as well as psychophysical 
and comparative studies by its adherence to dialectical procedures and the philosophy 
of identity. The idealists' stress upon the "history of consciousness" and the dynamic 
and teleological aspects of consciousness, mind, or spirit influenced the development of 
a genetic approach to psychology that was a definite forerunner of later "racial" and 
developmental psychology. This emphasis upon the historical, or genetic, method of 
analysis was related to the idealists' opposition to static dichotomies and to the bifurca- 
tion of reality. It should be noted here that their opposition to the division of the mind 
into various "faculties" was a major factor in the development of a more unitive, dy- 
namic, and functional view of mental processes. Largely because of the idealists, fac- 
ulty psychology was replaced in the nineteenth century by a more "organic" psychology 
in which one process was considered to flow directly, or dialectically, into another. 
Sensing, understanding, and reasoning, for example, were represented as progressive 
stages in the realization of consciousness, not distinctly separate processes. Since the 
time of the idealists, faculty psychology has never again been an accepted psychological 
approach. Furthermore, the idealistic conception of the systematic unity and interrela- 
tion of all the sciences, psychology included, encouraged--indeed, made necessary--  
the broadening of perspectives and the tentative beginnings of interdisciplinary work, 
for example, between physiology and psychology. Such interdisciplinary work was fur- 
ther encouraged, as we have seen, by Schelling's doctrine of identity, which proclaimed 
that Nature is "visible spirit" and spirit is "invisible Nature. ''5~ According to Schelling's 
doctrine, one could study spirit (e.g., as manifested in the mind) by means of the inves- 
tigation of nature (e.g., as manifested in the body); and vice versa. As noted above, this 
doctrine was a central influence upon Fechner's development of psychophysics. And 
combined with the genetic principle it contributed to the origins of nineteenth-century 
49 Elements of  Folk Psychology (1912), trans. Edward Leroy Schaub (New York: Macmillan, 1916), pp. 
2-10. 
5o Schelling, ldeen zu einer Philosophie der Naturals Einleitung m das Studium dteser Wtssenschaft, 2d ed 
(1803), in Schellings Werke, 1:706. 
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comparative psychology.  Regarding this latter point the discussion of the work of  Carus 
in the previous section is most pertinent. 
6. German idealism, despite its many contributions to specific aspects of psychol- 
ogy, did not influence the theoretical development of the concept of psychology in gen- 
eral. In fact, it opposed the development of psychology into an experimental and math- 
ematical science. This is an important qualification of  the positive influences we have 
discussed up to this point. It also helps explain why the contributions of  German ideal- 
ism to modem psychology have been over looked)  ~ As we have seen, idealistic psy- 
chology tended strongly to be nonmathematical,  nonexperimental,  and metaempirical;  s2 
it rejected any simply natural scientific approach to psychology as inadequate and tri- 
vial. Thus it acted as a counter-developmental force in this regard. 
To understand the full extent and effect of  this opposition we must recall that between 
1800 and 1840 idealism was the dominant philosophical approach in Germany.  
Throughout this period, especially after 1810, idealists had not only intellectual in- 
fluence but also institutional positions and power. This institutional power lasted into 
the 1850s, even after the decline of  their intellectual influence; and many important 
idealists, when their intellectual arguments did not convert their opponents,  used their 
power to suppress the spread of  empiricism and the development of  a more natural 
scientific approach to the mind. It is impossible to judge how much more quickly em- 
piricism would have spread, or how differently the history of  nineteenth-century Ger- 
man thought would read today, if real academic freedom had existed in the German 
universities in the first half of the nineteenth century. For instance, all three of  the most 
important German empirical psychologists in the first half of  the nineteenth cen tu ry- - -  
Fries, Herbart, and Beneke- -were  opposed and censured by the idealistic establishment 
at crucial points in their careers. 53 Both Fries and Herbart were in line for, and deserved, 
the chair of  philosophy at Berlin. Had Fries received the chair, Hegel would not have! 
Had Herbart, he would have succeeded Fries (or Hegel). Perhaps the most succinct 
example of  the power of  the idealists was Beneke 's  suspension from the University of  
Berlin, apparently at Hegel ' s  request, because his philosophical and psychological  
teachings were considered so ganz unphilosophisch--so unphilosophical,  that is, so un- 
idealistic. The use of  such institutional power, as well as the influence of  idealistic 
intellectual systems, clearly retarded the development of  psychology towards the empir- 
ical, mathematical,  and experimental science espoused by Fries, Herbart, Beneke, and 
5~ Several reasons seem to coalesce to account for the blindness of historians of psychology to the mfluence 
of German ideahsm: (1) German ldeahsm opposed the emergence of the natural scientific approach to psy- 
chology; (2) German ideahsm was in some essential ways antipsychological; and (3) the association of mod- 
em scientific psychology with dogmatic positivism had led to the naive belief that modem psychology is 
somehow autononous--histoncally and presently--from all philosophical influences, especially that of meta- 
physical ideahsm. Since history is often written to vahdate a particular contemporary point of view, ~t ts not 
surprising that the ~dealists have not recewed their due recognmon m the histories of psychology. However. a 
more just account should prevail. 
52 Essentially the idealist psychologists returned to the premises of rational psychology, which Kant had 
discredited in his Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Naturwissenschaft. Even though certain idealist psycho- 
log~sts tried to supplement the rational approach w~th empirical observation, tt was still true that they generally 
saw psychology as one branch of the total philosophical system of "science" rather than as an independent 
empirical or natural science. 
53 See my doctoral dissertation, "'The Reconstruction of Psychology in Germany. 1780-1850" (University 
of Chicago, 1977), chaps. 4.5, and 6. 
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others. To what extent the idealist opposition also helped shape the limits of the em- 
erging "new psychology" by provoking various positivist reactions is a topic worthy of 
future reseach. 
Thus the picture that emerges from these six points is two-sided. Although the three 
major idealists did not espouse the development of psychology except as an intermediate 
and incomplete stage in the construction of science, they nevertheless---often through 
their disciples--had a tangible influence upon the history of psychological thought. 
Their positive influence was upon what we can call the "microconceptualization" of 
psychology. That is, they contributed the microconcepts that focused the attention of 
psychologists upon certain relevant subject matters--such as consciousness. They also 
contributed concepts--such as identity, history, and activity--that inspired new ap- 
proaches to the "manifold of consciousness" and to the study of personality. 54 However, 
as regards the "macroconceptualization" of psychology--that is, as regards the concep- 
tualization of the general nature and methods of psychology--German idealism was 
counterrevolutionary, even repressive. It opposed the development of mathematical ex- 
perimental psychology as well as the institutional advancement of those who supported 
the natural scientific approach to psychology. (To be fair in our appraisal, we should 
note that the idealists of the last century were no more protective of their point of view 
than are many natural scientific psychologists in our century. Many of the same tech- 
niques-intellectual argument, ridicule, and institutional power--are used today to cen- 
sure those with opposing perspectives and approaches.) 
Nonetheless it should be clear that the idealists left their mark upon the psychology 
that developed beyond their own version of mental science. As is always the case, the 
so-called losing side in the drama of history had more influence than is immediately 
apparent. On the one hand, German idealism contributed much to the development of 
the conception of the subject matter of experimental psychology (especially conscious- 
ness and psychophysical relations); on the other hand, it also contributed to the general 
orientation of folk psychology (especially the genetic and social perspectives). And it 
can be assumed that it had other influences this general survey has not even mentioned. 
All these historical influences ought to be recognized. 1 hope that this article will be a 
first step towards this deserved recognition. By presenting a general survey of the rela- 
tionship between German idealism and the development of psychology, I have at- 
tempted only to open up a new area of investigation. Much research remains to be done. 
But if the conclusions of this paper are at all accurate, further research along these lines 
will greatly expand our understanding of the evolution--and thus the conceptual founda- 
t ions--of modern psychology. 55 Such enhanced understanding could be of some practi- 
54 In this regard, the &rect and m&rect influence of ldeahsm upon Freud m particular, and "depth 
psychology" m general, has yet to be fully explored. It would be truly remarkable if the concepts of ego, ld, 
and superego, as well as the historical approach and the doctrine of psychophyslcal parallehsm, all of which 
are essential ingre&ents of depth psychology, do not owe some sort of debt to the personahsm, voluntansm, 
social-psychological perspectwe, genetlclsm, and identlcahsm of ldeahst phdosophy. The debt of more recent 
personahst philosophies, including thetr denvatwe humamstlc psychologies, to ldeahst and neo~deallst concep- 
tions of self-actuahzation ts equally apparent. 
s5 One conclusion that can be drawn from thts study regarding the evolution of psychology m particular, and 
by extension science as a whole, ts that scientific advancement ~s often precondmoned by philosophtcal ideas 
rather than the accumulation of empirical facts Th~s conclusion, ~t ~s worth noting, is corroborated by an 
insight of the archpositivlst Ernst Mach, who insisted (rather incongruously, yet, I beheve, correctly) that 
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cal importance in an age in which there is much confusion about just what psychology 
is, what it should study, and how it should do so. Indeed the recent revival of neoideat- 
istic psychology, whether in the guise of humanistic psychology, dialectical psychology, 
or self-psychology, invites a reexamination of the conceptual structure of modem psy- 
chology. Historical and conceptual analysis cannot in and of itself answer the ultimately 
crucial question of what psychologists should do in the present. But it can at least 
provide psychologists with a fuller understanding of the historically rooted, and often 
unconsciously held, assumptions which underlie their scientific work. Whether or not 
they wish consciously to accept these traditional assumptions, which at times are at odds 
with one another, or whether they wish to accept new or more consistent guidelines for 
their work, is their decision. The historical muse will speak her mind at a later time. 
University of New Hampshire 
great scientific investigations, such as those of James Prescott Joule, could be "'camed out only by a man who 
is Inspired by a great and phdosophically most profound view of the world" (Die Prtnztpten der Warmlehre 
[Leipzig, 1896], p 240). Simdarly, as wc have seen, many of the historically fundamental investigations of 
modern psychology were carried out under the respiration of phdosophlcal, and often ldeahstlc, concerns. If 
we are less aware of---or even reject--these concerns today, we nonetheless continue to develop the traditions 
that were inspired--and are stdl conceptually supported--by them. 
